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16 August 1973

Miss Adrienne C. Thomas
Staff Assistant, ICRC
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Thomas:

25X1 We have completed the review of the additional pages of the background papers for the Gaither Report which were forwarded to [] 10 April 1973 by Mr. Tufaro. These are pages 34 through 49 of Section III, Volume 3, with Figure 1 attached.

We have no objections to the declassification of these pages.

Sincerely,

/S/

[]
Records Management Officer

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GFD:bec

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EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR MILITARY DEFENSE

The beginning of the period of critical danger this country faces, from an aggressively-posed and rapidly-developing enemy, is at most two years away. To mobilize the technological skills and the economic resources required to maximize and protect our offensive power and to build defenses against present and future enemy weapons will require a succession of prompt, informed decisions and efficient continuing direction of the whole gamut of defense activities. The organization that exists in the Department of Defense is inadequate for these critical needs.

NATURE OF INADEQUACIES

A succession of studies have reiterated the nature of inadequacies that limit the organizational effectiveness of the Department of Defense.^{1/} The basic inadequacy of the present organization is its inability to conduct warfare without special provisions being made to achieve unity and

^{1/} Report of the Committee on Department of Defense Organization (Rockefeller Committee) April, 1953; Business Organization of the Department of Defense, (Second Hoover Commission) June, 1955; Riehlman Report, Organization and Administration of the Military Research and Development Programs; (House Committee on Government Operations) August, 1954; Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, Dec. 1953; Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, April, 1954. See also United States Defense Policies Since World War II, House Document No. 100, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957.

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direct command relationships. This lack of unity results in:

a The existence of tripartite committees and other complex organizational arrangements that delay decisions by the Secretary of Defense while the interests of three Services are compromised; and a complexity of channels through which the Secretary must carry out operations and development programs.

b The inability of the existing organization to develop a unified military plan, and the lack of machinery to integrate separate Army, Navy, and Air Force plans into a single plan for the military operations that will protect this country.

c The duplication in each of the Service departments of military and support activities that are simultaneously maintained by other services.

d The splintering of responsibility for basic military functions; e.g., the air defense of the continent - and for the development of vital new weapons systems among the three Services.

PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO MEETING INADEQUACIES

Technological advance -- by our enemies as well as ourselves -- is making existing military weapons, doctrine and plans obsolete. Consequently, this country's defense organization must be continually adjusted to new needs. Present legislation prevents essential adjustments and denies the Secretary of Defense the flexibility he needs in using available resources.

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The Secretary of Defense is prohibited by the National

Security Act from:

- a. Transferring, reassigning, abolishing or consolidating the combatant functions of the military services.
- b. Indirectly accomplishing what is directly forbidden by detailing or assigning personnel or directing the expenditure of funds.
- c. Establishing a military staff.^{2/}

Lacking a military staff, the Secretary must rely on many inter-Service committees for much of his staff work. In time of war, the Secretary would be handicapped in resolving conflicting demands for such limited resources as manpower, transportation, communications, and industrial and other facilities.

In addition, the organic acts establishing each of the three military departments and the Marine Corps contain provisions fixing functions in these Services and thus preventing the reassignment of tasks as missions change. These provisions establish a rigid structure that handicaps the Secretary in deploying his forces as current missions and conditions dictate. Furthermore, present Acts appropriate funds directly to each of the three military Services and thus limit the Secretary's control. This limitation is aggravated by the

^{2/} See Appendix A to the Report of the Committee on Department of Defense organization, April 11, 1953.

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Statutory authority vested in the comptrollers of the Department and each of the Services.

OVERCOMING MAJOR OBSTACLES

Some improvements might be made within existing legislation. For example, the JCS might be freed of detailed operational matters and all existing joint operational commands could probably report to the Secretary of Defense. These and similar actions that can be taken within existing legislation should be implemented immediately. Others that will take more time are proposed below.

Revising Laws

An essential step in meeting the urgent need for improving the organization for military defense is to ask the Congress to repeal those provisions of the National Security Act and the organic acts establishing the three Services that limit the Secretary's authority to transfer, reassign, abolish or consolidate units and staff as may be required to improve the department's organization. Flexibility in establishing and realigning commands to meet changing defense needs is imperative. In any future conflict, time may not be available for such a large-scale defense reorganization as was necessary in the War Department after Pearl Harbor.

Establishing Operational Commands

To give defense the flexibility and readiness it needs operational commands should be created. These commands should

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have complete control over the personnel (e.g., authority to promote and discipline) and resources assigned to them and they should report directly to the Secretary of Defense for all major military missions that now cross Service lines. He should be authorized, with the approval of the President, to change, eliminate, or add commands as circumstances require. This necessitates the removal of the three military departments from the chain of command over military operations, and the provision of staff to the Secretary for strategic planning, intelligence, and military operations.

The need for these commands was borne out by the President in his Oklahoma City speech on November 13. He said that the design and power of our military defenses "must keep pace with the increasing capabilities that science gives to both an aggressor and a defender. They must continue to perform four main tasks:

"1. As a primary deterrent to war, maintain a nuclear retaliatory power of such capacity as to convince the Soviets that any attack on us and our Allies would result, regardless of damage to us, in their own nation's destruction.

"2. In cooperation with our Allies, provide a force structure so flexible that it can cope quickly with any form of aggression against the free world.

"3. Keep our home defenses in a high state of efficiency.

"4. Have the reserve strength to meet unforeseen emergency demands."

In time of war, no single military department can carry any one of these missions. In World War II, theater commands

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were established to unify Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Corps elements. Today separate forces needed for conducting certain missions are brought together in unified commands (Alaskan Unified Command) and joint or specified commands (North American Continental Air Defense Command).

Present unified and joint commands do not have completely efficient, integrated organizations to conduct operations. Their commanders do not have complete authority over the personnel and other resources assigned to them, and the chain of command from the President is not as direct and clear as it might be.

Elements from two or more military services are assigned to unified commands for "operational control" by the commander. This control is limited, however, because service elements of a unified command are administered and supplied separately by their respective arm. Thus, a unified commander is at the mercy of Services other than his own for the resources he needs to carry out his mission.

A unified commander's position is confused further by the lack of clarity in his relationships with higher authority. A unified or joint command may be organized under the JCS (such as NORAD) and one of the military departments is designated as the "executive agency" of the Secretary of Defense. Under certain circumstances, the military chief of the executive agency is authorized to direct commands for the executive

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agency department. He does so in the name of the Secretary of Defense. He must also keep the Secretary of his department and the JCS informed of his actions.

Consequently, a unified commander, such as the head of NORAD, may receive directions for the same functions from several officials. These officials may be the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the civilian secretary of a military department designated as executive agent, the Chief of Staff of an executive agency department in his position as military chief of that department, or in his position as agent member of the JCS. Who is authorized to exercise command over a unified or joint command? It is not clear.

This confusion can be eliminated by the creation of operational commands directly under the Secretary of Defense. Thus, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretary of Defense will have the flexibility to organize forces as and when required and the ability to exercise more direct control of military operations. Furthermore, the establishment of such commands will multiply the opportunities for top-level responsibilities for military men with outstanding capabilities.

Clarifying the Role of Military Departments

Another essential step is to define a revised role for each military department. The role of the military departments would be changed, not diminished. They would

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continue to be responsible to the Secretary of Defense for assisting with military planning. But, primarily, they would have the responsibility for the major and indispensable jobs of personnel and logistics. These major jobs underlie readiness for and the success of military operations. Relieved of direct responsibility for global military operations, the military departments will be better able to assist the Secretary of Defense with the management of these important activities.

Personnel activities comprehend the development of trained and equipped units ready for operations. This will involve recruitment of military and civilian personnel into the three Services and include the operation of service academies and the administration of basic, technical, and other training programs. Readiness for war and its successful prosecution depends in large part upon effective training of men and units. After assignment to operational commands, each military department will continue to have cognizance over the career development of its personnel.

The significance of logistical activities and their separation from operations is borne out by their concentration in a separate command during World War II. Commanders of military operations must concentrate their efforts and resources on winning battles. Their success depends largely upon the efficient development, production, and distribution

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of weapons systems and other materiel. The military departments will continue to be responsible for providing this essential support. This responsibility includes procurement, production planning, distribution, transportation, stockpiling, warehousing, maintaining industrial facilities, and construction. The magnitude of these activities is illustrated by the fact that procurement and production consume about one-half of the defense budget.

Creating a Research and Development Authority

To maintain superiority for conducting military operations, there is a vital need for creating organizational machinery that will expedite the translation of technological concepts into weapons systems that can be produced prior to conflicts. Our future military strength rests upon the efficiency with which we can select from a number of weapon concepts those that must be developed, and then ensure that they are brought expeditiously to the production stage and are made available for use by operational commands.

To achieve these objectives, the military defense organization must be provided with a Defense Research and Development Authority. The present Assistant Secretary for Research and Development should direct this authority. He should be a civilian, skilled in science, engineering and the administration of research, and report directly to the Secretary.

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This Authority should be responsible for -

a. Reviewing and approving for the Secretary the research and development programs and budgets for each of the three military departments. All appropriations for research and development should be made to the Secretary of Defense and allocated among the military departments or the Research and Development Authority upon the advice of the Assistant Secretary-Director.

b. Conducting or managing research and development on such projects and weapons as are of interest to more than one military department.

c. Establishing such policies as will ensure the development and proper utilization of scientific and engineering personnel for the conduct of research and development in the Department of Defense and the three military departments. To achieve this objective, the Authority should review on a continuing basis the conduct of all research and development activities within the military establishment.^{3/}

Improving the Secretary's Staff

Action then needs to be undertaken to develop a staff immediately responsible to the Secretary of Defense to

^{3/} See, for example, the Report on Improving Government Laboratories to the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization by James B. Fisk, Bruce S. Old, and Emmanuel Priore (OD-6649).

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aid him in obtaining and weighing the relevant views of the operational commanders and supporting services so as to facilitate hard, prompt decisions. To enable the Secretary of Defense effectively to serve as the civilian deputy to the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, two kinds of staffs are required: one, a staff of Assistant Secretaries to facilitate his management of all supporting activities - research and development, manpower, international security, comptroller, public relations, legislative, and other affairs; another, a command post-type staff, to aid him on military planning and operations.

a. The Staff of Assistant Secretaries: To aid the Secretary of Defense to manage and control the large and important logistical, manpower, and administrative problems of the military establishment, a staff of Assistant Secretaries somewhat similar to the present Assistant Secretary positions should be retained.^{4/} Their role, however, needs to be reconsidered.

Their primary task should be to assist the Secretary in carrying out his department-wide responsibilities for providing the operational commands with the resources and weapons systems they need to accomplish their missions. In

^{4/} We have not studied the necessity for each of the present Assistant Secretaries and are not prepared to offer recommendations as to the necessity for each. We recommend that consideration be given to the possibility of consolidating activities now assigned to several of these positions, and reviewing the possible need for additional positions.

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addition, the Assistant Secretaries should ensure that systems exist to provide the Secretary with complete, timely, accurate and understandable information upon which to base decisions on non-operational matters. Furthermore, the Assistant Secretaries should help the Secretary carry out a continuous examination and audit of the conduct of all supporting activities. This should include actual visits to posts, camps, and industrial facilities so that first-hand factual data on the status and conduct of supporting programs can be developed for the Secretary. Visits should also be made to operational commands to ensure that supporting activities are responsive to operational requirements.

b. The Command Post-Type Staff: To aid the Secretary of Defense on long-term planning and operational matters, the command post-type staff we visualize to facilitate his decisions will:

(1) Provide a unified -- not a joint -- point of view, and

(2) Consist of both military and civilian personnel (military members should be selected, promoted and relieved and on the basis of their capabilities for serving by the Secretary, rather than the Service or corps whose insignia they wear).

This staff should function only for and in behalf of the Secretary. It should not be empowered to exercise

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authority independently of the Secretary. It should serve

the Secretary in essentially the same manner that OPD served General Marshall in World War II. This "command post" performed for and in behalf of the Chief of Staff the unique functions of:

"1. The translation of approved strategy and policy into Army directives.

"2. The organization of theater commands adequate to perform the operations called for, and

"3. The deployment of trained, equipped forces to the theaters.

"Thus the Chief of Staff, through his Washington command post, was able to project strategic and operational requirements across the whole field of Army activities and needs. This emphasis on operations gave the whole War Department a single standard for organizing its efforts and a single staff for solving difficult day-to-day problems in the interests of the ultimate objective: success in battle."^{5/}

Success in averting and countering an attack today requires the type of command staff described above. Unlike OPD, however, this staff should assist the Secretary of Defense with personnel, logistics, and intelligence and other problems related to operations. Furthermore, it would assist him in conducting the long-term planning his responsibilities require. However, to ensure that long-term plans for military operations and those for their logistical support are appropriately coordinated and integrated with one another, the Secretary of Defense should have an independent planning

^{5/} See Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post; The Operations Division; Department of the Army, 1951.

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group. Such a group might be organized under a Deputy or Assistant Secretary.

This command post staff will not be entirely adequate, however, to provide the broad-gauged advice top civilian officials need. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, freed of command and operating responsibilities, should continue as the senior military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The original military planning and advisory role of the JCS, envisaged in the National Security Act, should be re-established and their staff should be drastically reduced to a small but strong planning group. To enable the JCS to fulfill their major responsibilities - the preparation of over-all strategic plans, the development of long-range logistic plans, and the review of war plans in the light of new weapons systems and techniques - each Chief of Staff should continue to be selected from among outstanding leaders of military operations, and the Chiefs of Staff should be empowered to delegate operating responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs and other subordinate officers.^{6/}

SUMMARY

The above steps for organizational improvement are as essential ingredients for the defense of this nation as are

^{6/} In addition to improving the Secretary of Defense's staff and taking the other steps outlined above, the Secretary of Defense should have complete control over funds, manpower, and other resources. These and other problems are not comprehended in this paper because it is intended only to illustrate the over-all concept of an improved organization.

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
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the missiles, submarines, warning systems, and air defenses

that will deter attack and save lives. They are required to ensure that decisions are made expeditiously and that resources are expended effectively. They are required to keep pace with an enemy that exhibits an ability to change directions, shift resources, and alter plans as rapidly as an evolving technology or new circumstances dictate.

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ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN FOR
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

* TO BE DIRECTED BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH & ENGINEERING

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